There are two popular forms of business-to-business (B2B) marketplaces: public marketplaces and private channels. We study why firms choose either or both of these sourcing channels. Using a framework of decision making under uncertainty, we explain firms' choice of B2B channels as a hedging strategy and as a method of obtaining greater managerial flexibility for the future. We show that greater uncertainty can lead to higher investment with firms more likely to invest in both public and private channels. We find that the level of information technology (IT) capability and spending is an important factor in firms' decision making. When a firm chooses its level of IT investment simultaneously with the decision about which sourcing channels to use, the firm choosing both channels selects the highest level of IT capability and the firm implementing only one channel selects lower levels of IT capability.
The literature in general suggests that selling multiple versions is more profitable than selling only a single version. However, how many versions should be offered is not as clear. Classical pricing studies suggest providing as many versions as the number of customer types, whereas some studies in information systems suggest providing only one or two versions. In reality, firms typically provide more than one or two versions, such as three in the case of Goldilocks pricing. This study explains the discrepancies in these results and observations by showing that, although profit increases with more versions, the marginal benefit of an additional version decreases rapidly. Therefore, firms sell few versions even in the presence of very small versioning-related costs such as menu and cognitive costs. This study analyzes the effects of these costs, and shows that cognitive costs have more profound effects on versioning than menu costs.
Business-to-business (B2B) electronic commerce has become an important issue in the debate about electronic commerce. How should the intermediary charge suppliers and buyers to maximize profits from such a marketplace. We analyze a monopolistic B2B marketplace owned by an independent intermediary. The marketplace exhibits two-sided network effects where the value of the marketplace to buyers is dependent on the number of suppliers, and the value to suppliers is dependent on the number of buyers and suppliers. When these two-sided network effects exist, we find that the optimal price for buyers and the fraction of buyers in the electronic market are dependent on the switching cost and the strength of the network effect of both types: buyers and suppliers. The same is true for the optimal price for suppliers and the fraction of suppliers in the electronic market. In other words, the parameters that define the buyers also affect the optimal price for suppliers and the fraction of suppliers in the electronic market, and vice versa. Our results also point some counterintuitive optimal pricing strategies that depend on the nature of the industry served by the marketplace.